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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that the fluidity that permeates the contemporary 
international community is driven by especially political and economic 
globalisation, which has a huge impact of the relationship between the nation 
and the state. As the individual nation state is increasingly depending on the 
international community for its economic survival this dependency on the 
global has as a consequence that it rolls back aspects of national sovereignty 
thus opening up the national hinterland for further international influences. 
These developments initiate a process of disaggregating state and nation, 
meaning that a gradual disarticulation of the relationship between state and 
nation produces new societal spaces, which are contested by non-statist 
interest groups and transnational more or less deterritorialised ethnic affiliated 
groups and networks. The argument forwarded in this article is that the ethnic 
Chinese utilises these newly created spaces for setting up diasporic like 
networks thus providing substance for transnational ethnoscapes or nations 
without states. 
 
Keywords: globalisation, nation state, diaspora, ethnicity, Chinese, Southeast 
Asia 
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Introduction 
 
When discussing the Chinese diaspora in especially a Southeast Asian 
context its coherent nature is often at the core of the discourse. According to 
several authors the Chinese diaspora is characterised by an enduring sense 
of transnational group identification and global linkages, which makes it well 
suited as an international channel for Chinese sojourners and migrants. The 
essence of these arrangements, generally based on narratives that pay tribute 
to the uniqueness of Chinese culture, is the so-called Guanxi networks, which 
characterises the different manifestations of this particular diaspora. It refers 
basically to national as well as transnational relationships revolving around 
language, ethnic, and kinship affiliations within and between Chinese 
communities thus giving them a comparative advantage over other networks 
because of their perceived common Confucian strength of mind. This is 
especially so when conducting intra-ethnic Chinese business in China and 
Southeast Asia, as these Guanxi networks have, according to proponents of 
this business approach, a capability of lowering transaction costs in these 
types of emerging markets where legal systems generally are 
underdeveloped. 
 
This paper questions the coherence ascribed to the Chinese diaspora 
in a Southeast Asian context, and to the coherence of diasporic networks in 
general, arguing instead that a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multi-
levelled and fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational network that 
allows people to move in and out of a given diaspora depending on their 
current social, economic and political situation. The adherence to a perceived 
affiliated diaspora thus depends on relative social, economic, and political 
contextual givens. An understanding of diaspora does therefore not depend 
on systemic network approaches, that is, theoretical constructs hovering 
above empirical and geographical constrains, but rather by analysing de facto 
socio-political contexts that delineate a given diaspora. 
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By taking such an approach it is imperative to describe the actual 
social, political, and economic forces which have the capability of initiating 
changes in the overall societal embedment of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast 
Asia. This is done by analysing the interaction between the latter, his or her 
community of residence together with the individual Southeast Asian state’s 
attitude towards the ethnic Chinese generally conceived of as a minority 
group within the national hinterland. 
 
As the state does not exist in a vacuum but constitutes an integrated 
part of an international community then this relationship and the dynamics 
within it also has to be accounted for, as it colours the state’s understanding 
of, in this particular case, the ethnic Chinese minority and its specific social, 
political, and perhaps more importantly, economic relationships, with its 
particular nation state of residence. 
 
Basically, this paper argues that the fluidity that permeates the 
contemporary international community is driven by especially political and 
economic globalisation, which has a huge impact of the relationship between 
the nation and the state. As the individual nation state is increasingly 
depending on the international community for its economic survival this 
dependency on the global has as a consequence that it rolls back aspects of 
national sovereignty thus gradually opening up the national hinterland for 
further international influences. These developments initiate a process of 
disaggregating state and nation, meaning that a gradual disarticulation of the 
relationship between state and nation produces new societal spaces, which 
are contested by non-statist interest groups and transnational more or less 
deterritorialised ethnic affiliated groups and networks. The argument 
forwarded in this article is that the ethnic Chinese utilises these newly created 
spaces for setting up diasporic like networks thus providing substance for 
transnational ethnoscapes or nations without states, as these spaces are 
labelled by some authors. 
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Such a reading of current affairs in an ever more globalising world 
leads towards a view that it is omnipotent and simultaneously local cum global 
in scope. The contemporary world can thus be characterised as displaying a 
high degree of time-space compression that allows us to immediately 
acknowledge different types of events regardless of where on earth they take 
place. It is this conception of immediacy that governs this author’s perception 
of the essence of contemporary globalisation. This view will be employed 
during the following discussion of the relationship between a budding 
disaggregating of nation and state, changing perceptions of citizenship, and 
transnational migration framed in more or less diasporic networks. In relation 
to the latter an emphasis will put on the ethnic Chinese in especially 
Indonesia. 
 
On The Changing Mode of the Contemporary Nation State 
 
Just as perceptions of the extent of the world have changed down 
through history so have the conceptions and constitution of the (nation) state. 
Arguably, one has to distinguish between the main raison d'être for pre- and 
modern types of states. Whereas pre-modern states were mostly concerned 
with controlling trade routes and making political alliances with more or less 
collaborative cultures in a fluid and difficult to control surrounding political 
landscape, modern states, linking their legitimacy to managing a carefully 
carved out geographically area, are obsessed with policing national borders, 
maintaining state sovereignty, self-determination, and non-interference in an 
international community generally thought of as consisting of predatory fellow 
states.  
 
The origin of the modern state is generally attributed to the Treaty of 
Westphalia on 24 October 1648 but it was only after the commencement of 
the industrial revolution in the beginning of the 18th Century Europe that the 
state evolved into its present form, that is, towards a state with a closely 
defined national territory. Historically speaking, the notion and construction of 
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the modern nation state is thus a relatively late comer. For example, the 
embryonic establishment of the Southeast Asia states only took off during the 
late colonial period and the contemporary Asian version of the modern nation 
state only began establishing itself during the transition from colonial to 
independent (nation) states in the mid 20th Century. This type of state differs 
markedly from pre-colonial forms of ‘states’ in the region, as they were either 
based on collaboration between one or two sultanates or consisted of fragile 
alliances between a sultanate and tribal like chieftainships kept together by 
political and military relations baked by highly elaborated trade networks (on 
early state formation in Southeast Asia, see Reid 1993). The contemporary 
perception of antiquity and thus permanency attributed to the modern Asian 
nation state is thus based on atavistic inspired ideological references to such 
sultanates and chieftainships, thereby unwittingly underscoring their own 
truncated life span and political and ideological attempts to legitimate their 
current form and function. 
 
The ‘classical’ conception of the contemporary nation state can in 
particular be allotted to the period after World War II, which entails, according 
to the realist school in international relation theory, a perception of the state 
as being an almost absolutist and total sovereign entity (see Krasner 1999). 
What is meant by that? Robert Jackson writes that the sovereignty that such a 
state ascribes to is to be perceived as a legal, absolute, and unitary condition. 
It is legal in that a sovereign state is not subordinate to another sovereign but 
is necessarily equal to it by international law – although not necessarily by 
international fact. It is absolute in that sovereignty is either present or absent. 
When a country is sovereign it is independent categorically: there is no 
intermediate condition. It is unitary in that a sovereign state is a supreme 
authority within its own jurisdiction. This is the case whether or not a state has 
a unitary or a federal constitution, because in either case it is a sole authority 
in its external relations with other states (Jackson 1990: 32). According to this 
the state is thus the sole and ultimate organiser of the national community. 
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A much used way of further knitting the relationship between nation 
and state together is to construct a nationalist inspired societal membrane 
between nations thus creating the necessary ‘other’ in terms of national self-
identification. This is done, for example, by imposing specific notions of 
citizenship that automatically exclude anyone who do not fall into such statist 
defined categories. David Castles and Alastair Davidson emphasis three main 
types of citizenship: 
 
ius sanguinis: citizenship is based on ethnicity or an ideologically constructed 
folk model which operates on the notion of descent from a national from within 
the country concerned when electability for citizenship is determined.  
ius soli: citizenship is based on multiple ethnic groups where birth in the 
territory of the country in question is more important than descent from 
citizens within a national legitimate ethnic group.  
ius domicile: this is a rather new way of gaining entitlement to citizenship as it 
is possible to achieve through mere residence in the national territory. It has 
also been referred to as a law of residence by some analysts.  
 
According to the authors the colonial powers usually introduced the 
nationality rules that existed for their own subjects in their colonies. This 
meant that throughout the British and American empires ius soli became law, 
while in French and Dutch possessions a combination between ius soli and a 
modified ius sanguinis was typically established (Castles and Davidson 2000: 
190). 
 
All three main types of achieving citizenship refer to different categories 
of societies even though they are all based on the above defined classical 
notion of the nation state. Citizenship defined along ius sanguinis lines makes 
it extremely difficult for non-nationals to achieve citizenship if they do not have 
a relative in the pertinent nation. And in case they do but these relatives are 
not born in the nation then it is still difficult to achieve citizenship. In this case 
it is completely up to the discretion of the individual state to grant a non-native 
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citizenship, which gives the state a high degree of control over who are to 
become citizens and not. All ethnic groups which have been incorporated into 
these states after independence thus faces immense obstacles in terms of 
jobs, education, health care systems, political rights, etc., as they are not 
regarded as original to the nation and thus not automatically entitled to 
become citizens. As a generic definition states which base themselves on this 
kind of citizenship can be termed ethnocratic states, as they base themselves 
on one or a small core of dominating (ethnic) group(s). According to Sautman 
(2002: 3) an ethnocracy is: 
 
… a descriptor for a regime that expresses the identity and 
aspirations of one ethnic group in an ethnically divided society, 
based on rule over other ethnic groups who are accorded only 
qualified rights to citizenship. Ethnocracy’s reason d’etre is to 
secure the key instruments of state power for the dominant 
ethnic collectivity; it allows only those facets of democracy 
consistent with the demos being identical with that groups and 
not the collective population. 
 
According to Castles and Davidson of countries which are based on 
principles close to those of ius sanguinis and ethnocracies one finds Papua 
New Guinea, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Vietnam, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan, and China. 
 
In relation to countries which have adopted the ius soli principle it is 
much easier to obtain citizenship. Castles and Davidson note that all nations 
which fall into this category are multiethnic with both indigenous minorities 
and a large population of foreign labours. Such states may be regarded as 
highly progressive because of the porousness of their citizenship rules which 
make them clearly distinguishable from the former colonies, which have 
reversed the British and American ius soli rules in favour of ius sanguinis 
ones. Of countries in the ius soli category we find Australia, New Zealand, 
India, Singapore, and the Philippines (Castles and Davidson 2000: 190-91). 
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Finally, ius domicile is generally combined with one of the two other 
main categories of citizenship. Paradoxically, according to Castles and 
Davidson it is countries that base their rules of citizenship on ius sanguinis 
that experiments most with ius domicile rules as a supplement to the general 
rules. The main idea behind this is to provide young people of immigrant 
origin with an option for becoming citizens. This development has a footing in 
a cynical calculation that the exclusion from citizenship is problematic, leading 
to social marginalisation, political exclusion, conflict, and racism. This 
experiment is thus born out of a need to preserve social and political stability 
(Castles and Davidson 2000: 93-94).  
 
Most if not all nations in the Asia-Pacific region is thus based more or 
less exclusively on either ius sanguinis or ius soli principles, as they provide 
the state with strong tools for controlling the flow of people in and out of its 
nation. It is only in regional organisations such as the EU that serious 
experiments with ius domicile has taken place. The reason d’être for this is 
likewise cynical as the increasing incorporation of nation states into a more 
integrated union has made this development imperative. This has meant a 
gradually easing of restriction of citizenship amongst EU citizens so as to 
further a higher degree of labour mobility and migration within the union, a 
mobility that is essential as the individual states develop in different tempi. 
How this, however, is going to be managed after the inclusion of 12 eastern 
and central European countries in 2004 and 2007 respectively has yet to be 
seen. 
 
As the Asia-Pacific region does not yet have this kind of political and 
economic integrated regions the imperative for incorporating ius domicile 
principles in their notions of citizenship has not arisen. The current 
development of regionalism is generally a statist driven process that has so 
far resulted in the formation of, for example, AFTA, APEC, ASEAN+1 and 
ASEAN+3, all based on principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
the individual member states. This non-intervention principle fits especially 
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well the ASEAN countries, as it reinforces their efforts of jealously 
safeguarding their relatively newly won sovereignty. I return to this in a later 
section when discussing the difference between regionalism and 
regionalisation and what this means for questions concerning citizenship and 
national coherence in terms of a budding disaggregation of nation and state. 
 
On Expanding Globalisation and Contracting Nation States 
 
The question now is whether the above described close relationship 
between concepts of citizenship, sovereignty, state, nation, and principles of 
regionalism are still possible in an international community that has become 
much more complex, interconnected and volatile during the last three 
decades. The reason for this scepticism is that various processes of 
globalisation, especially those which have to do with the increasing 
transnational mobility of finance capital, telecommunication technology, and 
transportation, have gradually become more entrenched nationally thereby 
strengthening the internationally oriented network already established there. 
 
Elaborating on the economic aspect of globalisation, Holm and 
Sørensen (1995) advance a scenario in which distinct national economies are 
subsumed and re-articulated into the global finance system by essentially 
international processes and transactions. Domestic politics, whether those of 
the private corporations or the public regulators, now have routinely to take 
into account the international flow of capital in their sphere of operations. The 
national is thus permeated and transformed by the international. Holm and 
Sørensen furthermore maintain that true economic globalisation invokes a 
qualitatively shift towards a global economic system that is no longer based 
on autonomous national economies but on a consolidated global marketplace 
for production, distribution, and consumption. According to this perspective, 
the global economy dominates the national economies existing within it (Holm 
and Sørensen 1995: 5). 
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This portrays an international community in which nation states are no 
longer capable of controlling the internal flow of capital due to the current 
transnational organisation of those flows. The scenario presented by the neo-
realists towards contemporary processes of globalisation does not, it seems, 
explain the dynamics behind the rapid changing international environment. 
Nation states are gradually becoming disempowered when implementing 
rules and regulations for managing economic transactions. The international 
community represented by WTO, are, for instance, forcing states to abide 
toward international standards when working out domestic economic policies. 
Furthermore, the previously fixed nature of centres of capital control has been 
transformed into multiple and shifting centres of capital accumulation. The 
East and Southeast Asian tiger and dragon economies as centres of capital 
accumulation before the economic crisis hit them in July 1997, together with 
the current rising economic might of Mainland China and India, stand in strong 
contrast to the continuing problems the traditional centres of capital 
accumulation, the US and Europe, are currently facing. The contemporary era 
of globalisation is thus characterised by shifting capital centres, as the global 
economy has become highly mobile and more or less immune to statist 
regulations and national borders. 
 
The contemporary nation states have thus seen their room for 
manoeuvring confined by this new economic order. This has entailed a 
hollowing out of their sovereignty as the IMF, ADB, the World Bank, WTO, 
ILO, and the UN have demanded acceding to and incorporation of 
international political and economic conventions and regulations when 
designing national political and economic policies. In case a state violates the 
agreed to international conventions and regulations sanctions are being 
imposed on it so as to force it to comply. The main purpose of these sanctions 
is to reintegrate the erratic state into the international community, as it despite 
the breaches still constitutes an integrated part of that community. Arguably, 
there are no room for non-complying nation states outside the international 
community as the latter encompasses the whole globe. As mentioned in the 
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beginning of this paper, today there is only one perception of the world even 
though it might be sub-divided or structured in many different ways. This is 
contrary to previous perceptions in which several conceptions of the world 
competed with each other for constituting the true one; perceptions which now 
must be considered archaic and if applied today an anachronism. 
 
Paradoxically, these international political initiatives, reinforced by 
economic globalisation, also empowered various ethnic groups within the 
national hinterlands thereby enabling them to mount pressure on the state to 
grant them recognition, from political autonomy to cultural respect. For 
example, a budding supranational morality framed in universal human rights 
agendas has created space for ethnic groups to promote issues on an 
international level, which again have the capability of initiating qualitatively 
shifts in the conditions of people’s lives at the local level (Holm and Sørensen 
1995: 5, Castles and Davidson 2000: 204).1 The same is true for a wide range 
of NGOs. 
 
Rephrased, it is possible to argue that various aspect of globalisation 
are leading towards an assertive resurgence of local identities thereby 
producing an increasing social and political awareness within ethnic groups 
thus making them influential players in the national political power game. 
Furthermore, globalisation is encouraging this development by supporting the 
emergence of a budding supranational moral construct based on an 
adherence to a universal human rights regime together with the 
implementation of notions of good governance and transparent democracy. 
Admittedly, this seems highly hypothetical when current international affairs, 
governed as they are by predatory neo-liberal strategies and total American 
political, economic and military hegemony, dictate a partial return to earlier 
anarchic periods in the international community. How the international 
community will deal with this negative development is still to be seen. Perhaps 
the solution to this problem is not to be sought in the political realm but rather 
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in the economic imperatives that the global economy is enforcing on the 
individual nation states. 
 
Put together, the dual effects of globalisation, that is, international 
intervention and local empowerment within the national sphere, constitute the 
beginning and end in an interrelated movement. This is what Friedman (1998: 
6) has coined the packing in of global events, products and frameworks into 
the local, not so as to de-localise the local, but rather change its content, not 
least in terms of identity. An interesting consequence of the connection 
between local identities and international normative patterns of behaviour is 
that they tend to reinforce each other. As we have seen it several times in 
Indonesia, the state cannot legitimately force ethnic groups into submission by 
referring the matter to a question of national security without immediately 
having the international community on its back. The reason is that having an 
ethnic identity besides a national one is legitimate in the eyes of the 
international community, spelled out as it is in the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminination that Indonesia ratified on 25 
September 1999 (Chin 2000: 30-31). As an humanitarian approach now forms 
part of the International Monetary Fund’s humanitarian platform and the latter 
constitutes one of main designers of Indonesia’s structural adjustment 
programme the Indonesian national government is forced to initiate policies in 
the form of, for example, economic decentralisation and regional autonomy so 
as to guarantee the rights of ethnic groups to participate in the current 
transformation of the Indonesian state and nation. This goes in relation to the 
organisational, political, ideological and economical aspects of nation making. 
Ethnic groups are thus secured, at least theoretically, international support in 
their jockeying for cultural recognition and political influence.2
 
The international community is gradually becoming more globally 
encompassing and more deeply entrenched within the individual nation state. 
This enlargement of the international space at the expense of the individual 
nation state has created new transnational spaces that are heavily contested 
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by various sub-national groups, which utilises them for transnational 
networking thus providing substance to what Ohmae (1995) and Guibernau 
(1996) tentatively has defined nations without states. Before I turn towards 
those kinds of ‘in between’ spaces or new frameworks for processes of non-
statist regionalisation it is important to address the question of the 
composition of the state cum nation in a global era. 
 
Towards a Disaggregation of Nation and State? 
 
Taking the volatile developments within the international community 
into account one is almost forced to ask whether the classical form of the 
state has reached its climax, historically speaking? For David Jacobson 
(1998) new transnational, international and regional entities, from international 
human rights institutions to the European Union are all constraining the state 
in some respects, and enhancing its role in others. He continues that today 
we are witnessing a gradual disaggregation of the nation state. The political, 
communal, and territorial components of the nation state, once thought to be 
deeply entangled, are gradually being unbundled. Territory no longer 
constitutes identity in that a territory and a people are no longer viewed as 
being inextricably linked. Diasporas and transnational identities are 
increasingly common. Jacobson stresses, however, that the state is not in a 
decline; on the contrary, its bureaucratic role is enhanced. It is the marriage 
between state and nation that is in question (Jacobson 1998: 444). 
 
In order to assess this statement a point of departure can be taken in 
one of the defining characteristics of the classical concept of the nation state, 
namely citizenship.  As discussed previously this was and still is mainly 
coined in terms of either ius sanguinis or ius soli. Despite the difference 
between the two concepts in obtaining citizenship they both refer to 
individuals who belong to a coherent entity made up of a functional 
relationship between state and nation. 
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One of the main characteristics of the present era besides those 
described above is a high degree of labour mobility and migration of various 
kinds. These movements are closely related to economic globalisation that 
enforces a complex region wide distribution of production modes and sites 
according to where it is most profitable. This encourages to even higher levels 
of transnational labour migration as labour conditions wax and wane 
according to changing economic tides globally as well as within the individual 
nation state. This mobility of people between nations and regions exert a 
major pressure on the concept of citizenship to cope with the flow of non-
citizens in and out of the respective national borders. 
 
Most of these migrants do not stand a change of becoming citizens in 
their current country of residence, as they do not live up the pre-set definitions 
of either ius sanguinis or ius soli. Instead they are generally being categorised 
as either denizens (foreigners with permanent residence) or margizens 
(contract workers or undocumented workers). As such they are maginalised 
by their community of residence in terms of political influence and access to 
economic and social benefits. 
 
According to the discussion on the relationship between the 
international community and the nation state the notion of promoting singular 
nationalities in a globalising world does not make sense in contemporary 
processes of regionalisation. This fact, however, does not seem to seep into 
the diplomatic discourse on statist initiated regional cooperation. For example, 
during a seminar series on the relationship between Mainland China and 
ASEAN at Hong Kong University in January 2003, in which diplomats from 
especially Mainland China presented their view on East and Southeast Asian 
regionalism, it was time and again emphasised that the main building blocks 
for regional cooperation were first and foremost mutual respect for national 
sovereignty, non-interference in national affairs, and regional cooperation 
based on consensus thus leaving binding treaties out of the question. In 
relation to regional cooperation per se the diplomats emphasised that even 
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though it was framed within a multinational forum the ultimate relationship 
between the member states was based on non-binding bilateral agreements. 
So much for mutual trust within the East and Southeast Asian region and 
among the nation states herein! The so-called ‘ASEAN Free Trade Area’, 
which is to eliminate import tariffs in 2015 at the latest, is in for a difficult 
period, as it entails a softening stand on current perceptions of national 
sovereignty. 
 
This official view of regional cooperation within East and Southeast 
Asia clashes head on with an analytical approach towards the relationship 
between the international community and nation states as discussed above. 
What we are confronted with here is an almost Thomas Hobbesian inspired 
anarchic perception of the relationship between sovereign states. Perhaps 
this perception guided the nature of the speakers at the seminar; they were, 
as mentioned, all diplomats with certain responsibilities towards their 
respective states. 
 
Nonetheless, the conventional notion of citizenship, ius sanguinis and 
ius soli, together with classifications of migrants of various sorts as either 
denizens or margizens are increasingly being attacked by a transforming 
international community which is forcing the individual nation state to 
reorganise its basic setup. This goes especially for those nation states which 
base their perception of citizenship on principles of ius sanguinis, and that is 
most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As globalisation is 
increasingly encroaching on the sovereign aspect of nationhood thereby 
facilitating a growing flow of migrant workers in and out of the individual nation 
state, then paradoxically these migrants are increasingly confronting problems 
when settling down in their host communities, as the latter desperately tries to 
impose new rules to regulate the influx of labour thus attempting to block the 
holes in the national borders. The main question to be addressed in this 
connection is, however, for how long the conventional statist perception of 
sovereignty and citizenship within a coherent national framework can hold 
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against the changing tides within the international community of which they 
are an unbreakable part (Ong 1999). 
 
The contradiction between political rhetoric as forwarded by the 
diplomats concerning the importance of upholding national coherence in 
relation to statist initiated regionalisation programmes and actual political and 
economic societal transformations within, for example, Southeast Asia are 
gradually becoming increasingly exposed. This is because statist induced 
regionalism in the form of politically, economical, and military cooperation 
clashes with a deepening transnational fluidity of the social, cultural and 
political landscape across the region thus exhibiting a progressing 
disaggregation between the individual state and its respective national 
hinterland. 
 
Reassessing the Ethnic Chinese Diaspora Against The Backdrop Of 
Entrenching Processes Of Globalisation  
 
The all important point of intersection in this discourse is the 
relationship between the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation, as the 
two refer to different societal processes. Regionalism refers to the operation 
of formal institutions (e.g. APEC and ASEAN); that is, state-led processes 
concerned with re-organising regional space along certain national political 
lines. In contrast, regionalisation refers to a bottom-up process of regional 
integration, for example, ASEAN+3, involving not only broad-based state and 
intergovernmental institutions, but also strategic interactions and choices of a 
whole range of non-state actors’, for example, ethnic groups, business 
networks, and non-governmental organisations. Only little has been written on 
regionalisation, implying a lack of knowledge about processes of 
regionalisation that occur on the ground, independently of state-led spatial re-
organisation. This returns us to the previous discussion on the production of 
space, that is, processes in which the international community is gradually 
becoming more globally encompassing and deeper entrenched within the 
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individual nation state. This enlargement of the international room creates 
new transnational spaces at the expense of the nation states that are heavily 
contested by various sub-national groups which utilises them for transnational 
networking thus providing substance for de facto processes of non-statist 
regionalisation. 
 
The process of transgressing nationally defined spaces involves the 
emergence of new forms of local and transnational spatial organisations such 
as supranational NGOs, transnational business communities, and cross-
border diasporic communities based on more or less deterritorialised (ethnic) 
identities. Arguably, processes of globalisation is thus implicated in the 
construction of supra- and sub-national spaces thereby disrupting old forms of 
spatial organisations as defined by the state while at the same time producing 
new and alternative non-statist spaces of power thus further threatening state 
sovereignty by reducing the room it is supposed to cover (Sassen 2000). 
 
This prompts us to forward the proposition that in modern global 
capitalism, there are no simplistic distinctions between the economic, the 
political or the cultural. Rather, these elements are all intertwined with the 
process of capital accumulation. Arguably, the production of identity is 
implicated with the production of economic and social power. In this context, 
identity becomes a form of ethnic capital disseminated through the creation of 
new spatial zones in the form of, for example, transnational business 
communities and ethnic affiliated diasporas or ‘ethnoscapes’ to employ a term 
coined by Appadurai (1991). Important related themes to be incorporated 
when studying such new spatial configurations include a disentanglement of 
the relationship between sovereignty, citizenship, national borders within a 
nation-state matrix, as well as the growing internationalisation of ethnic 
identities, together with a rise of multiple citizenship, seen as a natural 
outcome of an increasing disaggregation between state and nation (Jacobson 
1998). 
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Paying special attention to the ethnic Chinese diaspora in Southeast 
Asia and how they engage in the production of new cross-border spaces, Ong 
(1999) has defined ethnicity as a sorting mechanism for the creation of new 
spatial entities. According to this, the fragmentation of different spatial zones 
enables ethnicity to become an important key mechanism in determining the 
boundaries of these new spaces of power. Generally, these new entities are 
assigned to transnational ethnoscapes but they can also be described as new 
societal constellations, which are domestically configured along ethnic lines. I 
have described these developments in my earlier work on political fault-lines 
in North Sulawesi in Eastern Indonesia, where such new spaces of power 
manifest themselves in political mobilisation and stratification of different 
ethno-cultural groups thus underlining an uneven diffusion of power within a 
nation-state, that power is not just a top-down state governed phenomenon 
but is manifest at all societal levels, and that constellations of power are 
reflections of social and political tensions or developments fostered by 
domestically as well as international factors (Jacobsen 2002a). 
 
Returning to a transnational sphere I would argue by employing a 
fragmented and multi-layered conception of diasporic spaces, as migrants 
flow in and out of their respective diaspora through processes of 
‘diasporasation’ and ‘de-diasporasation’; that is, diasporic movements which 
are determined by individual social strategies together with localised political 
and economic constrains (Riggs 2001), this would open up a whole new array 
of questions concerning the production of new spaces identified as either 
inter-ethnic or inter-diasporic relations within and between nation states. 
 
For example, Gomez and Hsiao (2001) write that individual ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurs do not necessarily make business deals with each 
other on the basis of guanxi practices; that is, through ethnically defined 
transnational networks which facilitate business deals among Chinese 
entrepreneurs (Luo 2000), but with whoever can provide them with a profit, be 
it with intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic business ‘others’, thus linking up with 
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pertinent non-Chinese business communities within or outside their country of 
residence. Furthermore, Gomez and Hsiao are critical of the literature that 
highlights the importance of cultural infused dynamics of the ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs. They contest the thesis that the institutions, norms and 
practices of ethnic Chinese are the main reason for the growth of their 
enterprises. Finally, they question whether Chinese entrepreneurs have 
depended primarily on business networks based on shared identities to 
develop their corporate base. They thus distance themselves from the 
massive literature on Guanxi relationships and their influence on Chinese 
business practices (for an overview, see Li and Wright 1999) 
 
Guanxi networks are thus not essential for doing business between 
ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, as argued by Luo (2000) and Yang (1994), 
Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996), and Kotkin (1992), thereby questioning the 
coherent nature of these networks. Arguably, Guanxi business networks are 
thus but one strategy among other business strategies employed, when 
engaging ethnic- and non-ethnic Chinese business enterprises in creating 
new national and international spaces of transactions thus confirming Riggs’ 
notion of diasporasation and de-diasporasation. Furthermore, this hypothesis 
reflects Dirlik’s (1996) proposition that Guanxi business practices is an 
ethnicisation of capitalist practice, not a specific Chinese economy paralleling 
global capitalism. 
 
The all-encompassing and coherent nature generally attributed to 
Guanxi networks is also prevalent in discourses on the Chinese diaspora, 
conceived of as constituting an international router in relation to ethnic 
Chinese (business) networks (McKeown 2001, Bolt 2000). For example, for 
Kotkin (1992) the Chinese diaspora is characterised by an enduring sense of 
group identification and global linkages, and for Callahan (2002) the 
comparative advantage of the diaspora’s Confucian capitalism is that cultural 
ties lower the transaction costs of doing business in China and Southeast 
Asia, where legal systems are underdeveloped. This conception of diasporic 
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coherence is also prominent in the more theoretical literature on diaspora 
(Brah 1996, Safran 1999, Clifford 1994). For example, Shuval (2000), echoing 
Cohen (1997), finds that diaspora is a social construct founded on narratives, 
mythology, history, and virtual elements, all of which play a vital role in 
establishing a diasporic narrative. 
 
When taking a critical look at the literature on Chinese business 
enterprises and guanxi network in East and Southeast Asia, however, it 
becomes clear that such networks are multi-dimensional in terms of both 
meaning and function. For example, Yao Souchou writes that in China the 
term guanxi refers to any form of relatedness. It does not have any 
connotations specifically related to either commercial or political activities. In 
fact, guanxi is a generic term on which phrases representing more specific 
forms of relatedness are built. Thus, according to Yao we have guoji guanxi or 
international relations, routi guanxi or carnal relationships, fuji guanxi or 
marital relationships and so on. All these kinds of guanxi vary in terms of their 
respective emotional depth, social context and ethical bond. The social 
connectedness in the commercial world thus represents but one type of 
guanxi among many, so therefore we should strictly refer to shangye guanxi 
or commercial guanxi, when talking about guanxi practices in a business 
context (Yao 2002 2002: 236). 
 
Zooming further in on the relationship between guanxi and business, 
Wong (1998), Gomez and Hsiao (2001) and Jacobsen (2004) have problems 
finding evidence of that dyadic-linked guanxi affiliated business deals in either 
a local, national or transnational context dominate the business field. On the 
contrary, we find that ethnic Chinese transnational business relations are 
generally based on ad hoc arrangements and at best truncated forms of 
networking practices (Gomez 2004). By this is meant when Southeast Asian 
Chinese entrepreneurs, especially those representing small and medium 
sized enterprises, decide to transnationalise their business they might initially 
connect to fellow Chinese entrepreneurs, either through family connections or 
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previously utilised business connections. After this initial contact they branch 
out to the non-Chinese local business community in order to ‘sink in’ and tap 
on to the local business opportunities. This is what is meant by truncated 
business networks. The latter are thus shallow in terms of time and not 
necessarily confined to intra-ethnic relations but just as well to inter-ethnic 
business relations. Cribb (2000) furthermore contest the hypothesis that the 
various institutions, norms and practices of ethnic Chinese are the growth 
engine behind their enterprises.3 On the contrary, profit motives combined 
with a pragmatic reading of a given societal landscape in which to operate 
seem to prevail when doing business – be it with intra- or inter-ethnic 
partners. 
 
Echoing the above argument that ethnic Chinese networks and 
diaspora are not necessarily coherent constructs Ien Ang (2001) furthermore 
sounds a warning note saying that one has to recognise the double-
edgedness of diasporic identity, the latter being the main signifier of the 
concept that might otherwise not refer to anything else! She writes: 
 
Thus, while the transnationalism of diasporas is often taken as an 
implicit point of critique of the territorial boundedness and the internally 
homogenising perspective of the nation state, the limits of diaspora lie 
precisely in its own assumed boundedness, its inevitable tendency to stress 
its internal coherence and unity, logically set apart from ’others’. Ultimately, 
diaspora is a concept of sameness-in-dispersal, not of togetherness-in-
difference (Ang 2001: 12-13). 
 
Playing on the definition of diaspora as literally meaning ‘the scattering 
of seeds’ Ang thus defines diasporic networks as producing subjects for 
whom notions of identity and belonging are unsettled. According to her, 
diasporic subjects are exemplary cases of the multiple and hybrid 
subjectivities favoured by post-modern and post-structuralist theory. A 
dominant tendency, Ang continues, in thinking about the Chinese diaspora is 
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to suppress the ways in which diasporic identities are produced through 
creolisation and hybridisation in favour of a hierarchical centring and a linear 
rerouting back to imagined ancestral home. She cites Clifford in this 
connection: 
 
The centring of diasporas around an axis of origin and return overrides 
the specific local interactions (identifications and ruptures, both constructive 
and defensive) necessary for the maintenance of diasporic social forms. The 
empowering paradox of diaspora is that dwelling here assumes solidarity and 
connection there. But there is not necessarily a single place or an exclusivist 
nation (Clifford 1997: 269, italics in original, cited in Ang 2001). 
 
Ang argues that for Clifford, and perhaps for herself, the most 
important aspect of diasporic formations is the multiplicity of ‘here’s and 
there’s’ which together make up ‘decentred, partially overlapping networks of 
communication, travel, trade, and kinship that connect the different 
communities of a transnational “people”.’ (Ang 2001: 44-45). 
 
Such a decentred conception of diaspora in which the constitution of 
identity is based on creolisation or hybridisation if you like, positions cultural 
interaction and identification in the field of social expediency and political 
strategy. Playing on the interaction between achieved and ascribed identity 
and adding a time perspective of about one generation for allowing you to 
internalise the various practises of your community of residence, it is tempting 
to say that you are what you are expected to be; a context determined 
individual positioning that reflects your relationship towards your current 
country of residence. Consequently, having an identity as an ethnic Chinese 
in, for example, Malaysia or Indonesia does not necessarily imply that you are 
affiliated to Mainland China or devoted to Chinese culture and identity. On the 
contrary, you are a Malaysian or Indonesian of ethnic Chinese descent who 
for the time being has deposited your social and political loyalty in the local 
powers that be.4
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The political potency of ethnic identities is not lost on state ideologues 
who often try to rein in a plurality of ethnic identities in terms of multicultural 
ideologies. Ang defines the latter as a government policy to manage cultural 
diversity within a pluralist nation state. If the nation state can no longer 
maintain its homogeneity, based of the concept of ius sanguinis, then the 
second best solution would be to allow for the preservation of a diversity of 
cultures, but within certain, well-defined limits, for example based on ius soli 
principles of citizenship, so as not to disturb or threaten national unity. In 
short, according to Ang, multiculturalism is based on the fantasy that the 
social challenge of togetherness-in-difference can be addressed by reducing it 
to an image of living-apart-together. Basically, multiculturalism is nothing more 
but a more complex form of nationalism, aimed at securing national 
boundaries in an increasingly borderless world (Ang 2001: 14, 16) 
 
In writing about multiculturalism she notes that identity politics is a 
logical offshoot of the decline of assimilationism and its illusory promise of 
equality of the basis of a strived-for but never achieved sameness. The 
politics of identity relies quintessentially on the recognition and mobilisation of 
differences once the ideal of sameness has proved unreachably. Claiming 
one’s difference from the mainstream of dominant national culture and turning 
it into symbolic capital has become a powerful and attractive strategy among 
those who have never quite belonged, or have been made to feel that they do 
not quite belong in the West or any other places for that matter. The preferred 
name for that symbolic capital is ‘diaspora’ (Ang 2001: 11-12). 
 
A Case Study: The Indonesian Ethnic Chinese  
 
Having said that a diaspora is a decentred ideational construct based 
on creolised or hybridised identities, which are positioned within inter-cultural 
fields of social expediency and political strategy, refutes perceptions of 
diasporas as coherent systemic flows of ethnically linked individuals who 
through cultural bonds apply common social and political strategies in order to 
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positions themselves as favourably as possible in their community of 
residence. A decentred conception of diaspora links perfectly to the fluidity 
ascribed to the international community delineated earlier on in this paper. 
According to the latter individuals are no longer reigned in by predatory nation 
states in an anarchic international community. On the contrary, because 
aspects of national sovereignty are rolled back by an increasing entrenching 
international community it allows individuals and groups to flow in and out of 
nations in search of work and a better life. It is such social constellations that 
initiate new networks and reinforce or dismantle old ones based on multi-
cultural business relations or transnational ethnic affiliations. 
 
How to conceptualise this flow of people and what consequences does 
it have for the cohesion of the individual nation state? A promising point of 
departure in this connection is to focus on why individuals break up from their 
place of residence and how the individuals within the different networks settle 
down in their destination communities in stead of focusing on the networks 
themselves as they, according to my mind, are too elusive for rigorous 
analysis. Most networks are generally latent and are based on more or less 
cohesive narratives that mainly exist in the heads of those who have used 
them during previous migrations, are planning to move along them or are 
already moving through various contact points within a diasporic network 
towards which the migrant feel somehow affiliated. It is thus the intension of 
moving within a given diasporic network or the destination for that movement 
that constitute the crux of our analysis. Again it is a given social and political 
context in one’s place of residence that activates the network a migrant 
chooses to move along. 
 
As we have defined a diasporic network as being a decentred, multi-
levelled and fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational system then we 
have dissolved the classical perception of a home (original point of departure) 
and a host (the destination) as constituting the beginning and end point in a 
diasporic movement, as there might be several choices of what constitute 
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home and host. In order to pin down what triggers individuals to activate and 
thus participate in such elusive networks I will in the following, for the sake of 
simplicity, concentrate on the Indonesian ethnic Chinese. 
 
As it is generally local social and political circumstances, which in this 
particular case also include national policies on especially citizenship and 
national ideologies concerning multicultural coexistence as they resonate 
down through the various societal levels, that motivates an individual to link 
up to a pertinent diaspora, let us then look at how the ethnic Chinese perceive 
themselves and how the community of residence perceives them. Wang 
Gungwu (1996) employs the concept of sojourning thus employing a historical 
perspective in his description of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. According 
to him a sojourner is a temporary resident who is at his new place of 
residence ‘for the time being’, that is, for a non-specified period of time. After 
that he returns to his original home, perhaps to repeat the trip at a later date. 
Gungwu notes that this concept fades into the concept of migration but that 
there is a time difference between the two concepts. Sojourning has been 
pervasive in Asia for centuries and implies that the sojourner settled down in 
the host community in case conditions for doing so were favourable. It was 
thus not only work that constituted the main driving force behind becoming a 
sojourner as the term migrant seems to implies (Gungwu 1996: 1-2). On the 
other hand, sojourning is also different from immigration as the basic notion 
behind the former was the temporality of the trip. Immigration implies a one-
way trip with an expressed wish of settling down in a new home country. The 
best known example of sojourners are those coming from the southern 
provinces of Mainland China, especially Hakka and Hokkien speaking people 
who in the latter part of the 18th Century went to West Borneo and Bangka in 
today’s Indonesia to work in the tin mines and plantations found there. Some 
of those sojourners, who originally started out on a labour contract ticket 
stayed on in Indonesia but most went back after their work contract expired 
(Heidhues 1993: 68-88). 
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Present day Indonesia does not have a big ethnic Chinese community 
compared to, for example, Malaysia. The latter has about 27 per cent ethnic 
Chinese out of a total population of 22 million, whereas Indonesia only has 
about 2.9 per cent ethnic Chinese out of a total population of about 215 
millions. Most of the Indonesian ethnic Chinese originates from Fujian and/or 
Guangdong provinces in southeast China and can be classified into five main 
language groups such as Hokkien, Teochius, Cantonese, and some 
Hainanese from Hainan Province. The fifth main language group, Hakka, is 
scattered throughout southern and southeastern China originating from the 
provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan, 
and Hainan. Some also originates from Taiwan. They are sojourners and 
migrants par excellence. 
 
Traders from these areas have traveled to and from the Southeast 
Asian region for several centuries before the arrival of the Europeans setting 
up trade links to present day Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.5 In relation to the ethnic Chinese 
during the period of Dutch East Indies many of them were brought there by 
Dutch traders. As they were not allowed to own land they were to a great 
extend confined to cities and towns which resulted in the setup of a complex 
trade infrastructure, as this was the only avenue available to them for 
obtaining a livelihood.6 The ethnic Chinese were thus mainly recruited by the 
Dutch to serve as middlemen between the colonial authorities and the local 
population. This colonial policy of non-integration and non-assimilation into 
the Indonesian society have had grave implications for the ethnic Chinese 
ever since, as they have frequently been accused by Indonesians for sitting 
heavily on trade and finance thus making it difficult for Indonesians to move 
into these areas. For this historical conditioned reason the ethnic Chinese 
have been made scapegoats whenever social and political crises have 
eventuated in Indonesia. 
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When taking a closer look at the Indonesian ethnic Chinese community 
two main groups’ stands out. The first one is the Peranakan and the other one 
Totok. Peranakans7 was formerly known as Ali-Baba. The latter originates 
from ‘Ali’, which means pribumi (indigenous people) and ‘Baba’, which means 
‘Indonesian born Chinese’. Ali-Baba used their local status to claim a higher 
status over the Sinkeh, the new Chinese immigrants (Beng 1997: 25-26). The 
modern usage of Ali-Baba refers to a joint Indonesian-Chinese business or 
more specifically to an Indonesian frontman in an enterprise secretly financed 
by an ethnic Chinese. According to William Skinner (1996:78-79) Peranakan 
refers to ethnic Chinese who had developed a creolised or mestizo culture 
with strong Indonesian characteristics. These Chinese are descendants from 
the original immigrants to Indonesia or imported by the Dutch during the early 
colonial period as traders and contract labours. The most important 
characteristics of the Peranakans were and still are that they marry local 
Indonesian women and speak Bahasa Indonesia within the family. Proficiency 
in Chinese languages and knowledge of traditional Chinese culture has 
gradually disappeared. Today most Peranakans do not speak, read or write 
Chinese. 
 
The other main group of Indonesian ethnic Chinese is the Totok. This 
term refers to a full-blooded Chinese in Indonesia. They are recent immigrants 
or children of recent immigrants, who speak a Chinese language and practice 
traditional Chinese customs within the family (William Skinner 1997: 86, 88-
92). They were originally contract labours during the 1920s and 1930s where 
the immigration rate was at an average of 4.3 per cent annually. This 
immigration rate fell rather sharply after WWII and came to a complete stand 
still in the early 1950s, where the Indonesian authorities did not allow further 
Chinese immigrants. They came mainly from Hokkien, Cantonese, and Hakka 
language groups. The Totoks practice speech-group identification as an 
important means for identifying group membership. Because of laws 
implemented in 1959 and onwards forbidding non-Indonesian people to 
engage in retail trade outside towns many Totoks moved from the Outer 
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Islands to centres of economic activities, especially around Jakarta and other 
main cities where their main markets were. Modern Indonesian Chinese 
business culture is mainly dominated by Totoks. 
 
The Indonesian authorities and society in general have always been 
ambivalent towards the ethnic Chinese. It seems as if there exists a certain 
inclination towards anti-Chinese riots down through the post-colonial and 
colonial history. This can be seen when comparing negative social, economic, 
and political development and the appearance of anti-Chinese riots. A main 
precondition for this correlation, it seems to me, is that the Chinese is 
generally conceived of as a foreign minority and thus non-Pribumi. 
Furthermore, besides the before mentioned Indonesian grievances towards 
the ethnic Chinese for dominating the economy, international political 
developments have also helped fuelling anti-ethnic Chinese resentments. 
 
For example, in the early 1950s the newly established communist 
government in China opened an embassy in Jakarta’s China town which was 
followed-up by a number of consulates in other major cities. The diplomats 
were very active in contacting the ethnic Chinese. It resulted in a re-
sinification of the Chinese community in terms of an increasing circulation of 
Chinese literature, the opening of many Chinese language schools, practices 
of Chinese religions together with building of temples throughout the country. 
The main aim of these activities was the reorganisation of the ethnic Chinese 
as an ethnic group, which were to exist on an equal footing with the other 
ethnic groups in Indonesia. It was a process of integration not assimilation. 
 
This development brought the Chinese communities into the limelight 
and questions of political loyalty and national belonging became a hotly 
debated topic. According to Tan (1997), of the 2.45 million ethnic Chinese 
believed to live in Indonesia at that time, about one million could be 
considered having dual nationality; that is, having citizenship in both China 
and Indonesia. In order to correct this it was decided to force the ethnic 
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Chinese to make a choice between citizenship in one or the other country. 
This resulted in the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality, signed in 
Bandung on 22 April 1955. It stipulated that the ethnic Chinese had to choose 
which nationality they preferred during the period January 1960 to January 
1962. Most of the about one million ethnic Chinese with dual nationality 
registered and of them about 65 per cent opted for Indonesian citizenship. In 
practice this meant a huge exodus of ethnic Chinese, about 400,000 people, 
from Indonesia, heading towards the new Chinese nation (Tan 1997: 33-35). 
 
The plight of the ethnic Chinese had, however, only started. In 1957 
the authorities demanded that all Indonesian citizens attended Indonesian 
schools. This meant that thousands of Chinese schools were closed. The 
period around 1965-66 was a particular bad one as many Chinese were killed 
and driven out of, for example, Aceh, North Sumatra, and rural areas in west 
Kalimantan. The main reason was that especially the political elite and the 
military thought the ethnic Chinese were collaborating with the Indonesian 
communist party (PKI) and that the first president Sukarno were relying too 
much of the Chinese and PKI for political support. 
 
This further changed dramatically when President Suharto’s New Order 
regime (1966-1998) replaced what was left of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy 
in 1965. The new regime initiated an intense programme of assimilating the 
ethnic Chinese into the Indonesian community by forbidding Chinese names, 
signs in Chinese characters in public places, publications, cultural and 
religious practices, constructions of new temples, etc. so as to domesticate 
and pull the Chinese into mainstream New Order Indonesia. Nonetheless, 
despite these assimilatory measures the ethnic Chinese were still marked out 
both in terms of education, that is, they could not join the majority of 
universities and could not get employment in the bureaucracy and military. 
Even the most assimilated ethnic Chinese was marked out as all Chinese had 
a code in their passport that indicated they were of Chinese descent and thus 
not ‘blue-blooded’ pribumi Indonesians.8
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Things changed again after President Suharto was toppled in May 
1998. The interim president Habibie and the following two presidents, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, allowed the ethnic Chinese 
to practice their traditions, especially the Chinese New Year, learn Chinese 
languages, publicise newspapers and books in Chinese, and generally make 
Chinese culture more visible in the Indonesian society. The forced 
assimilation programme was thus formally abolished. This new zeitgeist was 
stipulated by a presidential degree issued in 1998 that instructed ministers 
and chiefs within the bureaucracy to scrap all discriminatory practices against 
the ethnic Chinese. And in May 1999 Chinese initiated political parties such 
as the Chinese-Indonesian Reform Party were formed and the renowned 
economist Kwik Kian Gie became deputy chairman of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Later on the 
same year he became Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and 
Industry in the Abdurrahman Wahid/Megawati Sukarnoputri administration. He 
was thus the first ethnic Chinese to attain a ministerial portfolio in the post-
Suharto era. After sizing power in July 2001 Megawati Sukarnoputri’s 
administration, represented by the Minister of Religious Affairs issued Decree 
No. 13 stipulating that Imlek or the Chinese New Year was a national holiday. 
On the basis of these changes life for the Indonesian ethnic Chinese became 
somewhat easier. The current president, Susilo Bambang Yudhojono, has 
continued the reconciliatory approach towards the Chinese. 
 
These changes, however positive they might be, also posed new 
challenges for the ethnic Chinese community. The remaining discrimination 
against them, especially in terms of obtaining Indonesian citizenship and 
having to state their ethnic belonging in their passport, still lingers on not 
forgetting the general anti-Chinese sentiment in the Indonesian society, 
carefully nurtured by the New Order regime throughout the 32 years it existed. 
What is more problematic, however, is a growing split within the ethnic 
Chinese community itself, a split that revolves around the question of identity. 
Although not an entirely new problem the question of how to designate 
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themselves has really come to the forefront in the post-Suharto era. Labels 
such as Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Chinese, Chinese nationals or Nationals of 
Chinese Descent have been applied to the Chinese, not only in Indonesia, but 
throughout Southeast Asia, indicating a tense relationship amongst the ethnic 
Chinese, their respective nation states, and Mainland China thus turning an 
ethnic label into an important political signifier. For example, Suryadinata 
(1997: 20) writes that for recent migrants their ethnic identity is stronger than 
their national identity. This is not a problem when China’s relations with the 
individual Southeast Asian state are cordial. But when China-Southeast Asian 
relations turn sour then the ethnic Chinese generally become the focus of 
resentment from the indigenous people. 
 
This international tendency of classifying the ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia as nationalised foreigners with a doubtful political loyalty 
towards their communities of residence also poses tremendously problems for 
the ethnic Chinese themselves. If labelled Overseas Chinese then they are 
not thought of as true nationals in their community of residence, only 
sojourners with perceived strong ties to Mainland China, which might pose a 
political threat, and even if labelled Ethnic Chinese with many generations in 
their host community behind them as evidence of their adherence to their host 
turned national community, then they are more or less social and political 
marginalised as can be seen in especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. This dual nature of identity on behalf of the ethnic Chinese thus 
represents a national security liability. As Tan Chee Beng (1997) states in a 
response to Leo Suryadinata on the status of the ethnic Chinese in a 
Southeast Asian context, 
 
Ethnic Chinese perceives themselves as nationals and not overseas 
Chinese. Their homeland is thus their father/mother-land, not Mainland China. 
Overall, the Chinese in Southeast Asia should not be called ‘Overseas 
Chinese’ as it is a label which is appropriate only for citizens of China living 
overseas.  
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He concludes: 
 
As proud citizens of our respective countries, we feel insulted to be 
called or even referred to as ‘Overseas Chinese’. We are overseas in China 
but not when we are at home in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and so 
forth (Beng 1997:25-32). 
 
The main question here is whether the Southeast Asian states, 
especially Indonesia, will let the ethnic Chinese themselves decide what they 
prefer to be labelled. As we have seen in the case of Indonesia, at the bottom 
line it is national politics that decide what label to apply to the ethnic Chinese. 
Parallel to these external discourses internal fault-lines from within the 
Indonesian ethnic Chinese communities themselves are gradually surfacing. I 
am here referring to the distinction between Peranakans and Totoks. 
 
Today the relationship between Peranakans and Totoks highlights the 
heterogeneity of the ethnic Chinese community in Southeast Asia. Anyway, 
they have never been a homogeneous group as also maintained by 
Suryadinata (1997), as the ethnic Chinese reflect different social and political 
circumstances in their respective host communities as well as different 
circumstances under which they became ethnic Chinese in a Southeast Asian 
context. The difference between the Peranakans and Totoks thus represent a 
further differentiation of the ethnic Chinese community. The first stands for 
assimilation into the Indonesian community. The latter are also trying to 
accommodate assimilation policies but with due respect towards Chinese 
culture and traditions and not the least towards the ancient ‘homeland’ China. 
Furthermore, current tensions between these two groups also link up to 
international relations even though they are played out in a local setting. For 
example, in the shadow of Mainland China’s ascendance towards economic 
superpower status, Totoks tries to re-sinicise the Peranakans so as to make 
them remember and thus re-inculcate their ethnic and cultural background. 
This re-sinification process seems to gain momentum among the Indonesian 
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ethnic Chinese community especially after Suharto was forced to step down in 
May 1998 thereby making them more visible as a distinct ethnic group that 
demands cultural autonomy and political recognition on an equal footing along 
with other ethnic groups from the Indonesian state. If history has a tendency 
to repeat itself then this new visibility and the more or less conflicting 
strategies emanating from within the Indonesian ethnic Chinese community 
makes it an ambivalent and multi-directional ethnic group towards which many 
Indonesians, and especially the political elite, have difficulty relating to in 
terms of questions of identity and political loyalty. As the Indonesian society is 
still undergoing profound societal transformations the plight of the ethnic 
Chinese thus seems far from over taking their violent and scapegoating 
historical precedence into account. 
 
The Ethnic Chinese Diaspora and Contemporary Processes of 
Globalisation: Some Concluding Remarks 
 
As can be seen the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia is being 
squeezed by various national as well as international requests for social and 
political conformity, which include a high degree of ethnic and cultural 
stereotyping thus intensifying old grievances and new frictions within the 
ethnic Chinese communities and between them and various sections in the 
Indonesian society. Furthermore, as the largest enterprises in modern ethnic 
Chinese business culture are dominated by Totoks this puts further pressure 
on the relationship between the Peranakans and the Totoks in terms of 
economic and political positioning in their respective fields of interests. This 
insight becomes so much more important taking the growing economic 
cooperation between Mainland China and Indonesia into account. 
Peranakans are thus gradually becoming economically and as well as 
politically marginalised in relation to social status both within the ethnic 
Chinese community and in the Indonesian society in general due to their 
muted cultural affiliations. There is thus a pressure on the Peranakans to 
become Totoks through processes of re-sinification if they are to succeed in 
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business. Additional insight into these developments is pending further 
research. 
 
It is a combination of these different types of pressure on the individual 
ethnic Chinese that triggers his or her desire to relate to an affiliated diasporic 
network in order to try his or her luck in another community in case the 
pressure becomes too much to bear in the place of residence. Processes of 
social uprooting like these followed by actual moving to another host 
community, nationally or transnationally, can be characterised as sojourning 
or perhaps better as attempts to assess whether a new location provides 
better security and opportunities compared to the current place of residence. 
In case the new place of residence turns out to be a viable alternative in terms 
of a better social, economic, and political societal positioning then the 
sojourner transforms him- or herself into a settler in the new home community. 
In this way the diasporic network has become yet another reference point 
bigger for other sojourners to relate to in their search for an alternative and 
perhaps more profitable life. 
 
Arguably, these diasporic movements differ markedly from general 
notions of labour migration, as they are not channelled through agents or 
other institutionalised recruitment centres, that they are not characterised by 
circular migration or other repetitive patterns of migration, and that they carry 
a high degree of long term settling down in the new home community. 
Contrary to migration patterns in general, the movements of the ethnic 
Chinese within the Chinese diaspora as described above provide substance 
to the notion that a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multi-levelled and 
fractious, generally ethnically affiliated, ideational network thereby confirming 
James Clifford’s perception of diaspora as dwelling here assumes solidarity 
and connection there but that there is not necessarily a single place or a 
nation. On the contrary, there can be many ‘here’s’ and ‘there’s’ in such 
networks. It furthermore confirms Fred Riggs’ perception of processes of 
diasporisation and de-diasporisation, as people move in and out of a given 
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diaspora depending on their current social and political situation. The 
adherence to a perceived affiliated diaspora thus depends on a relative social, 
economic, and political context that might motivate an individual to break up 
from a known locality once an otherwise pervasive notion of trust in it has 
been undermined. The notion of diaspora as having a grand narrative based 
on a home and a destination is thus highly simplistic and can therefore not be 
supported.  
 
As demonstrated in the first part of this paper the changing format of 
the nation state and its relationship to the likewise changing international 
community of which it is a constituent part has opened new windows of 
opportunities for moving around within the Southeast Asian region. Not only, 
of course, for ethnic Chinese but for all categories of labours and migrants, 
professionals as well as for spontaneous movements. This is not to say that 
we are only talking about voluntary movements in the form of labour 
migration, sojourning or immigration. As mentioned above, the situation on a 
given locality can change fast and dramatically as we saw it in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. This initiated major societal transformations in 
especially Indonesia, triggering massive unemployment thereby kicking off 
more or less forced movements of people in search of labour outside 
Indonesia, branching out throughout the Southeast Asian region. 
 
This, however, is just one side of the coin. The other side reflects 
statist attempts of ‘tightening-up’ rules of citizenship thus further siphoning off 
huge numbers of people, as they no longer fit into pre-designed citizenship 
slots based on either ius sanguinis, ius soli or a combination of these two 
main principles of obtaining citizenship. Individuals who already lives on the 
margins of society are thus being targeted by the establishment which 
mercilessly classifies them as either denizens or even worse margizens, that 
is, people with very few or no rights. The case of Malaysia expelling 
thousands of Indonesian migrant labours is a case in point. The paradox in 
these developments is that the nation states cannot seal themselves off from 
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the international community, as the dynamic there is based on political and 
economic globalisation on which every single nation state depends for its very 
existence. For example, the constant relocation of transnational capital flows, 
production practices, and business connections force the individual nation 
state to open up its borders for various types of labour migrant, sojourners, 
and immigrants in general, as their own industrial complexes and trade 
sectors depend on different types of human resources, which flow within and 
between nation states so as to be able to keep up with internal and external 
competitors. 
 
This intricate interplay between nation states and processes of 
globalisation has as one of its main consequences that it roles back aspects 
of national sovereignty and thus gradually opens up the national hinterland for 
further international stimulus. These developments have resulted in the 
production of new societal spaces, which are being contested by non-statist 
actors based on transnational and thus more or less deterritorialised ethnic 
affiliated identities thus creating an alternative sense of belonging to the 
otherwise fixed statist’s perception of citizenship. The main argument 
forwarded in this paper is that the ethnic Chinese utilises these relatively 
newly created spaces for setting up diasporic like networks thus providing 
substance for the establishment of transnational ethnoscapes or nations 
without states as they are labelled by some authors. As discussed, these 
networks do not have a life of their own but constitute latent possibilities which 
become activated when given social and political developments question the 
general security in the community of residence. These networks thus wax and 
vain according to social and political developments within the affiliated home 
communities. As such they facilitate movements of individuals within a given 
region that is circumscribed by a decentred and fragmented diasporic 
narrative thus providing them with an alternative way of pursuing the good life. 
It is developments like these that provide substance to processes of sub-
national regionalisation driven by a host of localised transnational social and 
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political forces thus producing a more broad based integration of the region 
compared to statist initiated formal processes of regionalism. 
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